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Abstract. The Treaty of San Stefano brought peace after the Russian-Turkish and the 
second Serbian-Turkish wars. The Russian interests prevailed in this Treaty, which 
among other things contributed to creating Greater Bulgaria as a Russian interest 
sphere. This state of affairs did not bode well with European powers, which found the 
possibility of regulating the new state of Europe by convening the Congress of Berlin 
and revising the Treaty of San Stefano. Serbia, still a vassal country de jure, could not 
participate at the Congress and it defended its interests by a whole array of diplomatic 
activities, on the margins of the Congress and in the European capitals that had the 
power to decide at the Congress. Serbia did not manage to accomplish the maximum of 
its objectives and interests but what it did attain was much more than what the Treaty 
of San Stefano had offered. 
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1. SERBIAN-TURKISH WARS AND THE TREATY OF SAN STEFANO 
The geostategic and political redistribution of power in Europe during the 1870s was 
favorable for embarking on the processes for achieving the national ambitions of the 
peoples of the Balkans, especially those who had already had self-government, and the 
semi-independent states featuring a larger or smaller degree of independence. The battles 
for the unification of Italy were over by 1871. After the victory in the war with France (1870), 
Germany was united in 1871. Two years later, Germany, Austria-Hungary and Russia made a 
diplomatic alliance (The League of Three Emperors), which heralded not only a new and 
more active role of European powers in dealing with the Eastern Question (the issue of 
                                                          
Received December 8th, 2015 / Accepted December 18th, 2015 
Corresponding author: Nebojša Ranđelović, LL.D. 
University of Niš, Faculty of Law, Trg kralja Aleksandra 11, 18000 Niš, Republic of Serbia 
E-mail: necer@prafak.ni.ac.rs 
124 N. RANĐELOVIĆ 
succession to the Ottoman provinces in Europe) but also a division of spheres of influence on 
the Balkans. In that process, Serbia saw an opportunity to increase its territory and change the 
already accomplished de facto independence into formal de jure independence. The 
uprisings of the Serbian folk in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which marked the middle of the 
1870s, were the motive for the Principality of Serbia to ask the High Porte (the central 
government of the Ottoman Empire) for authority over Bosnia in order to prevent new turmoil, 
before Russia and Austria-Hungary would come to an agreement about the division of the 
spheres of interest. Initially, the Austria-Hungary approved of this idea. Alongside the 
diplomatic activity, the Serbian Prince Milan Obrenović and the government were exposed to 
considerable pressure by nationalistic circles and intelligence to go to war with Turkey. This 
state of affairs broke even the most persistent opponents of war, including the Prince himself. 
Yet, there was a common agreement that Serbia could not prepare for and wage war under the 
guidance of the government headed by Prime Minister Kaljević (known as “The First Action 
Ministry”). Despite his personal antagonism towards liberal ideology, the Prince turned to the 
liberals and their leader Jovan Ristić. The new government was formed on 24th April 1876, with 
Stevča Mihailović as Prime Minister and Jovan Ristić as the Minister of Foreign Affairs. This 
government was known in public as the “The Second Action Ministry” (Bartulović, 
Ranđelović, 2012: 72).  
Serbia went to war in 1876 but it turned out that, of all the allies, Serbia could seriously 
count on Montenegro only and a few volunteers, mostly officers from Russia. Serbia was 
defeated in this war and, even though Serbia waged this war against the suzerain, the status quo 
ante was restored at the Constantinople peace conference in December 1876. The government 
was held accountable for unsuccessful warfare and obtained “absolution” by the National 
Assembly, even though the entire process could have been circumvented according to the 
Constitution. The Russian-Turkish War started in 1877 and it was soon joined by Serbia, which 
ultimately triumphed, together with Russia and other allies. 
After winning the war and arriving at the walls of Constantinople, Russia used its 
superior position in an attempt to seize the opportunity to conclude peace itself, minding 
its own interests. After being saved by the British fleet, which had prevented the Russian 
forces from entering the capital of Constantinople, Turkey was reluctant to cede part of its 
territory to Serbia. The High Porte proclaimed that the Turks “were ready to surrender a 
number of important forts to the victorious Russian army but their national pride did not 
not allow them to yield ground to the Serbs, who had avoided the deserved punishment the 
year before only because of the Russian ultimatum.” However, Turkey had no other 
choice. Thus, the preliminary Russian-Turkish peace treaty, the Treaty of San Stefano, was 
entered into on 19
th
 February 1878. According to this peace treaty, the only true winner was 
Russia, alongside with Bulgaria. All the other participants had some losses, and Turkey 
practically lost control over all its European territories. Montenegro, Serbia and Romania 
were officially recognized as independent states. Serbia was allowed to keep Niš and 
enlarge its territory towards Novi Pazar and Sanjak. Pirot and Vranje were given to Bulgaria. 
The territory of Montenegro was expanded towards Herzegovina and the port of Bar. Muslims 
from those parts were guaranteed the right to property (Articles 1-6 of the Treaty). Article 14 
of the San Stefano Treaty attempted to address the problem of Bosnia and Herzegovina: 
“The European suggestions, which had been announced to the Ottoman proxies at the first 
session of the Conference held in Constantinople, will be carried out immediately in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, with changes that are to be decided by a common treaty between the 
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High Porte and the governments of Russia and Austria-Hungary…”1, but it did not manage to 
solve the problem comprehensively.  
The greatest attainment of the San Stefano Treaty was the creation of Great Bulgaria 
as a tributary principality. Considering the nature of the proposed system of government, 
it was a combination of some features pertinent to Serbia before and after the Congress in 
Paris. Thus, Bulgaria was to remain under the suzerainty of Turkey and it was obliged to pay 
a yearly tribute. Bulgaria was to have a Christian government, with a prince chosen by the 
people but confirmed by the High Porte, subject to approval of the great powers. It was 
entitled to organize a national army; all Turkish forts were to be demolished and Turkey was 
not supposed to keep parts of its army on the territory of Bulgaria. The future 
administrative organization of Bulgaria was to be established before the election of a prince, 
in the presence of an Ottoman imperial commissioner but under control of the Russian 
imperial commissioner. The Russian imperial commissioner was also vested with the authority 
to supervise the operation of the established regime.
2
 The territory of the newly created state 
was to spread from the Black Sea to the Albanian mountains, including a large piece of 
Macedonia, some liberated Serbian towns, a part of Kosovo and a large piece of coastline on 
the Aegean Sea. From the political point of view, Bulgaria was envisaged to be an extended 
hand of Russia in these parts because the peace treaty explicitly provided for the Russian 
control over the functioning of the new principality. It was actually meant to be a Russian 
military outpost and a first step towards conquering Constantinople and taking the 
Mediterranean, the goals which were only waiting for new opportunities. From a 
geostrategic point of view, the Principality of Bulgaria was to enable sovereign Russian 
control of this part of Europe. By gaining control over such a large area, Russia strategically 
endeavoured to cease the spreading of the Turkish influence into other parts of southern 
Balkans and Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as to preclude the expansion of the Austro-
Hungarian influence towards the south-east. The victory of Russian military force would, 
thus, be complete. When deciding on the provisions of the Treaty of San Stefano, Russia was 
strictly guided by the principle of pure interests rather than by ethical principles or wish to 
conquer. It would have been dangerous for Russia to satisfy all the requests of Serbia and 
support a country whose obedience and blind loyalty could never be fully relied upon. 
Things were quite different with Bulgarians, who were given the opportunity to have their 
own country. As Russian interests were not separate from the Bulgarian interests, Russia 
decided to satisfy the interests of Bulgaria first and then (if possible) the interests of Serbia. 
However, such a deal which did not include all the parties concerned was but a 
collection of wishes rather than a reflection of realistic possibilities. Other great powers 
could not accept the Russian triumph. Even before the signing of the Treaty of San Stefano, 
German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck announced a congress of great powers, aimed at 
resolving the Great Eastern Crisis. Bismarck pointed out that in the “Eastern Question” he is but 
a “fair proxy” with the task of finishing things as soon as possible (Hvostov, Minz, 1949:49). 
But the “fair proxy” role actually meant that Bismarck renounced his active support to the 
Russian government and that the “European Concert of Powers” would have the last 
word. Thus, three days after the signing of the Treaty of San Stefano, Count Andrassy put 
forward an official proposition for convening a congress which would decide upon the 
                                                          
1 Balkan Foreign Relations and Treaties: 1876-1996, vol. 1, Belgrade, 1998,  pp.88-90. 
2 Ibid, pp. 78-80. 
126 N. RANĐELOVIĆ 
conditions of peace between Russia and Turkey (Hvostov, Minz, 1949:49). The other great 
powers also approved of this kind of solution. 
This proposed solution was accepted even by Russia, without much resistance. 
Intensifying the crisis would have opened up the possibility of waging a new war where 
the British and Austro-Hungarian weaponry would have been used against Russia. According 
to diplomatic sources, this kind of consideration was primarily posed by Grand Princes 
Nikolay and Mikhail (who were heads of the army), the Minister of War Milutin, and the 
Minister of Finance Reitern. Gorchakov was also inclined toward this standpoint. Their 
conclusion was that further warfare was undesirable for Russia (Hvostov, Minz, 1949:49). 
Bismarck himself was encouraging the Russian government to go for that solution. 
Interestingly, the role of a peacemaker was assumed by Bismarck who had formerly 
encouraged the Russian government to enter into the the Russian-Turkish War. 
The achieved agreement on solving the disputed questions at a congress brought a host 
of diplomatic correspondence, which should have prepared the field for making decisions even 
before the congress itself. It is interesting to mention and analyse some parts of the intense 
diplomatic communication of the time. A telegram sent from Saint Petersburg to the Russian 
mission in Vienna in mid-April 1878, explaining Russia‟s actions during the war and 
afterwards, showed to the Austro-Hungarian government that Russia was still standing by the 
agreements reached before the war, and that it did not deny Austria-Hungary the right to 
occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina. According to this telegram, the possibility of splitting 
Bulgaria into two parts was also considered and approved, whereby its south-eastern part 
would have been subject to a more extensive influence of the High Porte onto the 
government administration, and the correction of San Stefano borders would have been 
effected in accordance with the ethnic principle.
3
 Around the same time, the Austro-
Hungarian government sent a Memorandum to the British government, explaining the 
directions of the Austro-Hungarian politics and why it was necessary to occupy Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. The Memorandum was accompanied by an Appendix contained a geostrategic 
and geopolitical analysis, sending fateful messages which would unfortunately mark the 
entire century, and especially its end. At the beginning of this document, Austria-Hungary 
explained that the existence of a larger Slavic country in the south of Europe would be 
dangerous for general stability. Dalmatia was brought up as a geographic factor of instability 
concerning the property of the monarchy; being a narrow maritime belt, it could not hold its 
own without some stable hinterland. The text further elaborated on the reasons why Bosnia and 
Herzegovina could not exist as an autonomous region or a state entity. The reasons were of 
geographical, economic but mostly ethnic and religious nature; the Appendix text read: “A 
huge difficulty already exists in the very differences between Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
Herzegovinians are mountain people, poor and belligerent; Bosnians are agrarian and 
peaceful people of a distinct landowner class. Thus, if these two areas were to be organized by 
the principle of self-government, the same form would not fit both, so that two autonomies 
would have to be created. Each of the two areas is too poor for this type of self-government. 
However, at the same time, they are together. Much bigger obstacles are religious by nature. 
The population consists of Muslims, Orthodox Serbs, and Catholics, who live not only 
separately in villages and counties but also together in same towns and villages; so, there is 
frequent animosity. Considering the inevitable arguments between individuals as well as 
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within the entirety of these elements, it would be understandable that each part would 
want support from the outside… For those reasons, an autonomous constitution of those 
areas, even if it could be doable some time, would inevitably represent a transitory 
experiment which would, to put it simply, have to lead to unification with one of the 
related neighbouring countries.”4 Later on, the Appendix refers to Serbia which was 
perceived as an imminent threat to the stability of the monarchy, or rather, the entire middle 
Europe: “Should these two lands, incapable of autonomy, join with Serbia or Montenegro, or 
even unite into a single country, a new creation would emerge which would bring into 
question our borders and peace on them. By creating a Slavic group like this between our 
border provinces Dalmatia, Croatia and Slavonia, we would be put in a disadvantaged 
position. We would either have to annex the whole Slavic complex and thus put all the Slavs 
that want unification within our control, or expose ourselves to the danger of Serbo-Croatian 
masses on our soil constantly being disturbed by the attractive prospects of that creation 
which would, out of tradition and interest, be directed towards expansion according to 
common ancestry.”5 
It is for economic reasons that Austria-Hungary was against Montenegro spreading along 
the Adriatic coast. The aforementioned telegram from Saint Petersburg points out to Andrassy‟s 
opposition to this expansion of Montenegro. Andrassy unequivocally expressed the fear that 
“should Montenegro be given access to the Adriatic coast, it would be a good opportunity for 
smuggling.”6 
Serbia‟s territorial requests pertaining to Old Serbia, i.e. Kosovo and Metohija, were also 
deemed unrealistic. Even at the time of signing the Treaty of San Stefano, Turkey was firmly 
against these tendencies, and Russia supported Turkey‟s reasoning. Geostrategically 
speaking, such an attitude suited Austria-Hungary as well. In a letter to Gorchakov dated 
18
th
 February 1878, Count Ignatyev explained this attitude and the opposition to establishing a 
common border between Serbia and Montenegro, and even the possibility of leaving a 
narrow corridor towards Sarajevo for Turkey which was not expected they “to relinquish 
control of Mitrovica, the main railway spot towards Thessaloniki, the strategic key for 
Bosnia.”7 Attached to this letter was the program of the Prizren League, formed just before 
the beginning of the Berlin Congress, in which the Arnaouts declared loyalty to the High 
Porte and clearly showed animosity towards Montenegro, Serbia and Bulgaria by sending a 
fateful threat: “In accordance with the besa, we, the representatives of the unbeatable heroes 
of Northern Albania, Epirus and Bosnia, the heroes who, since birth, have not known a game 
other than weapons and who are ready to give their blood for the Empire, for the nation and 
for the homeland, have chosen Prizren as the seat of our League and will not allow any 
conqueror to disturb us and oppress the citizens of our country. This League will be 
transferred from us to our children and our nephews, and whoever leaves it will be treated as 
removed from Islam, and may a curse and scorn from all of us befall them.”8 
These circumstances and the actions of official and secret diplomacies have all conditioned 
the inevitable changes to the provisions of the Treaty of San Stefano. The framework 
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within which the new peace contract would operate was already recognizable. It only had 
to be verified and fine-tuned with regard to attaining a diplomatic advantage for the conflicts to 
come. The framework was also recognized in the secret British-Russian memorandum dated 
18
th
 May 1878, whose transcript was later handed to the German government. The provisions 
of the Treaty of Berlin, which was yet to come, were not considerably outside of the 
framework planned by the memorandum. The Treaty envisaged as follows: the eventual split 
of Bulgaria, the correction of its borders in accordance with the ethnic principle and its 
retreat from the Aegean coast; the retreat of the Turkish army from southern Bulgaria, and 
equal British and Russian influence in solving the question concerning the regulation of 
Epirus, Thessaly, and other Christian provinces; the British involvement in solving some 
questions about the Caspian basin; etc. This memorandum was not significant only as 
agreement between two opposed powers, one of which insisted on preserving “The Sick 
Man on the Bosphorus” at any cost while the other worked on its final destruction. It was 
generally recognized as the beginning of agreement between the two powers, which would 
become a necessity in the following century before the Germanic “Advance toward the 
East”. Following all these preparations, the Congress of Berlin was ready to begin. 
2. THE CONGRESS OF BERLIN 
The aim of the Berlin Congress, to establish peace and stability in Europe for a longer 
period by securing agreement of the “European Concert of Powers”, had been defined long 
before the beginning of the Congress. The framework within which peace solutions would be 
pursued was also known. The Congress participants were only supposed to define the 
particulars which would ensure peace and the rules for maintaining the new state of affairs.  
In his interview for the London Times, one of the initiators of this kind of outcome of 
the Great Eastern Crisis, Bismarck described the causes and consequences of the engendered 
state of affairs and the directions which the Congress would follow; moreover, he assumed 
the role of head peacekeeper: “I wanted peace and, as soon as I realized it was possible, I 
started working on securing it as much as I could.”9 However, in his analysis of the 
geopolitical situation in Europe and the consequences thereof created by the war, the 
peacemaker (who himself had contributed to the beginning of the war) underscored that the 
imperative of peace would be achieved only by coordination of interests and by concessions 
“severed” from the pretensions of the superpowers involved. That meant that no power 
could count on achieving the maximum of its interests, but also that Turkey as the losing 
party would not be facing the full consequences of disastrous defeat as envisaged by the 
Treaty of San Stefano. He also pointed out that the powers were committed to having the 
job done all the way through and that there were no obstacles in that endeavour. Being 
asked what would happen if Turkey walked away from the Congress, Bismarck explained: “As 
far as I am concerned, it wouldn‟t trouble me too much. Europe clearly demonstrated its 
good will and reconciliation spirit by inviting Turkey to attend the Congress. In effect, if 
Europe strictly adhered to the provisions of the San Stefano Treaty, Turkey should not be 
able to sanction our decisions. And if Turkey chooses to default, their seats will remain vacant, 
and we will see the conference through.”10 
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The outset of the Congress activities indicated that the voice of the superpowers would 
prevail over the voice of justice of those countries that the Congress was to decide about, 
which made the representatives of the Balkan countries aware that they would have to 
resort to informal means to ensure that their voices were to be heard at the Congress as well. 
Only the superpowers had the full right of participation in the Congress activities, through 
their standing representatives. However, during the second session, the British 
representative posed the question of Greece‟s participation at the Congress, stating that 
“the Slavs are protected by a powerful military state (Russia), to which they are linked by 
tribal ties, common religious belief and recent victories, whereas the Greeks have no 
single representative.”11 The Russian remark that it considered itself to be the protector of 
all Christians was inconsequential; the Turkish remark that it considered itself to be best 
protector of its subjects was equally without effect. At the third session, the French 
representative proposed that the Greek government should appoint a proxy, who would be 
present in Berlin and heard out whenever the Congress deemed it necessary. Serbia was 
not given such an opportunity. For this reason, Jovan Ristić, the plenipotentiary of Serbia 
at the Congress, resorted to using all forms of non-institutional action and diplomatic activities 
on the Vienna-Berlin-Belgrade route in order to ensure that Serbia‟s voice would be heard at 
the Congress. 
The Memorandum that Ristić submitted to the Congress of Berlin on 12th June 1878 
was supposed to be a summary of Serbia‟s requests and their reasoned justification, but it 
was also the only official way for the voice of Serbia to be heard at the Congress. Apart from 
the public and private (covert) contacts outside of the Congress chambers, which were aimed at 
providing support for Serbia‟s requests in decision-making processes, memoranda and 
diplomatic correspondence were the only possible mode of communication between the 
Serbian government and the Congress. In this Memorandum, drawing upon the historic 
occurrences over the course of several centuries (from the fall of the Serbian medieval state to 
the formation of the vassal principality), Ristić addressed two major issues: the recognition of 
the formal independence of Serbia, and the expansion of its territory with full regard to 
the ethnic and historic principles. The main arguments in favor of independence were the 
overall relations between Serbia and the High Porte, terminated by the wars, as well as the 
fact that “the High Porte itself recognized Serbia‟s independence and renounced its 
suzerainty by signing the Treaty of San Stefano.”12 While explaining the general relations, 
Ristić particularly underscored that “banditry and heinous atrocities committed by the 
Turkish army in the parts of the Principality they penetrated during the 1876 war have 
„embittered‟ the Serbian people and made them forever resentful towards the High Porte.” He 
also pointed out to the issue of finances, which the Porte seemed to regard as the most 
important reason: “For Serbia, a small country just liberated after long centuries of 
oppression, where the entire system was yet to be created, the imposed tribute dues were a 
proportionately grave burden, preventing its development. Now that the war devastated some 
parts of the Principality, paying the tribute has become impossible.”13 All things considered, the 
Memorandum asserted that establishing old relations with the Porte was unfeasible. 
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As for the territorial expansion, the proposed arguments were of ethnic and historic 
nature, and mainly resting on the principle of conquered territory. Given that the Serbian 
army had already had control over most of the territories that Serbia aspired to expand 
into, the Memorandum posed the following question: “How can the aforementioned 
territories be surrendered and given back without exposing the population in these parts to 
the Muslim vengeance and without subjecting the country to further violence, which no 
one can bear any longer?” The Memorandum suggested a relevant response to the 
question:  “The best means for the blessing of lasting peace to be ensured is to gratify the 
rightful wishes of the people in these parts, by setting them free and enabling them to join 
the motherland.”14 According to these demands, the Serbian borders had to be expanded to 
include include the areas of Kičevo, Skopje, Egri-palanka, Trn, Pirot, Belgradjik, and Vidin. 
The issue of independence was not contested at the Congress. The solution was given by the 
representative of the High Porte, Alexander Karatheodori Pasha, who stated that the Porte 
would not oppose Serbia‟s declaration of independence; he pointed out that this question was 
mainly a matter of formality given that Serbia actually had de facto independence in the 
previous decades. However, he reminded that: “In the interests of Europe as well as in the 
interests of Serbia, it should be noted that Europe confirmed the vassal relations which have 
hitherto connected this principality with its suzerain. The right given to Turkey under these 
agreements was used in moderation and Turkey has never infringed upon this right, even when 
faced with the most certain of evidence, when this right was used as a guarantee for the 
settlement of disputes which drew considerable attention of Europe‟s in different times. The 
broad scope and boundaries of this suzerainty (administration) have enabled Serbia to attain 
real independence, which had been acknowledged by Serbia on multiple occasions; these 
are irrefutable facts… If the idea of independence is prevalent among the European 
governments, Turkey will not be against it as we are convinced that the independence, 
which the Congress is requested to recognise, will be real independence and that these 
countries will accept it with full regard to rights as well as duties imposed thereby to be 
respected and observed in the future…”15 
Considering the issue of territorial expansion, it was obvious from the outset of the 
Congress that Serbia‟s requests would be only partially satisfied. The danger of ceding 
Serbian territories to Bulgaria was removed by the agreement of the major powers to establish a 
tributary principality of Bulgaria and an autonomous region of Eastern Rumelia on the 
Bulgarian land. Serbia‟s aspirations in Old and Southern Serbia were limited by the strategic 
interests of the major powers, based on the compactness of the Banja Luka – Thessaloniki 
route. Instead of being under the Serbian control, these parts remained under the sovereignty of 
the High Porte and under direct control of Austria-Hungary, which had its military outposts in 
the Sanjak of Novi Pazar. The eastern borders were to be drawn according to the ethnic 
principle, which was opposed only by the unjustified requests of Greater Bulgaria nationalists, 
discretely supported up by Russia. There were propositions to have a special commission 
examine the ethnic structure of the Pirot and Trn districts, and delineate the Serbian-Bulgarian 
border upon these findings. Having doubts about the objectivity of a special commission, Ristić 
sent a letter to Count Peter Shuvalov, the Russian representative at the Congress, and 
recommended a direct declaration of the people inhabiting those counties. This proposition 
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was completely unsuitable for Bulgaria. The inhabitants of these areas (Pirot, Trn, 
Zneplje, Slivnica, etc) sent official addresses to Prince Milan (the liberator), 
unequivocally stating their preference. Notwithstanding the people‟s will, the toponyms, 
individual names and surnames, along with their family patronyms, spoke volumes of 
their ethnicity.
16
 In the end, the prevalent solution was to grant the areas of Pirot and Trn to 
Serbia, and the area of Caribrod to Bulgaria. However, as Ihtiman remained under Turkish 
control for strategic reasons in the south, Bulgaria was given Trn as compensation. Thus, 
Serbia was given the area of Pirot, the territory up to Caribrod and a piece of the Trn district.
17
 
This method of border-marking deviated from all the principles, apart from one: the ease 
of trading lands of another for the purpose of exercising the politics of balanced scales. Yet, 
these facts show that Serbia should have been content even with the accomplished level of 
acknowledgement of its interests. At the Congress, the major powers were primarily driven 
by global and personal interests. Partial interests of “smaller nations” were most frequently 
neglected. Bismarck himself used to say that “if he was to waste time at the Congress in the 
heat of summer, he would do so only to prevent fights between great powers. He was 
disconcerted by how much energy was being spent on discussing the fate of „stinking dens‟ 
such as Larisa, Trikala or other Balkan towns” (Hvostov, Minz, 1949: 51). 
Another peculiarity occurred during the session aimed at discussing the independence 
of Montenegro, when the Congress decided to hear the plenipotentiaries of the Romanian 
government in spite of the decision that representatives of principalities would not be 
directly involved in the Congress sessions. Therefore, one may conclude that it was 
intended to preclude the Russian pretentions towards the ethnically Romanian territories. 
Alongside the recognition of independence and territorial expansion, Serbia was under 
pressure to adjust its legislation in line with the standards imposed by its new position. The 
pressure regarding discriminatory provisions regarding the position of Jews was especially 
prominent, and there was a concrete proposition of provisions regarding civil and religious 
equality in Serbia: “Citizens of the Principality of Serbia, regardless of their religious 
orientation, will enjoy full equality and have equal rights. They will have the right to be 
admitted into state services, to hold public offices, to enjoy privileges and to engage in 
professional activities, without being disqualified on the grounds of religious belief and 
related differences. The practice of all religious services will be completely free and open 
to public, and there will be no interference either in the hierarchical positions of different 
religions or in their internal relations with their spiritual guides.”18 
To remove such unnecessary pressure, Jovan Ristić sent a letter directly to Bismarck, 
the Congress Chairman, where he elaborated on religious freedoms in Serbia: “Mr. Chairman, 
fearing no dispute, I can confirm that, among all the lands in the East, no country is more 
tolerant in terms of religious belief than Serbia. Free practice of every recognized religion is 
guaranteed by the Constitution of the Principality (article 119); moreover, the government is 
exerting its best power to facilitate it. For example, although the number of Protestants is 
unsubstantial, there is a protestant church in Belgrade and the priest receives government 
financial support. The location for erecting a catholic church has already been arranged. 
The mosque in Belgrade is supported by the government for Muslims passing through, as 
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there are currently no people of Muhammadan religion living in the capital anymore. As 
for the Jews, I have to note first and foremost that there are only around 1,200 Jews living 
in Serbia. They enjoy completely equal rights as the citizens of other religious creeds. 
Moreover, I may say that they are in a privileged position because, while the orthodox 
priests are supported by the Orthodox Church, the Jewish rabbi in Belgrade receives state 
support of 600 Franks... In order to be fully equal, we only need to abolish an old ordinance 
which forbids Jews to settle outside of Belgrade… Anyway, Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to 
tell the Congress that I have been entitled by His Highness, the Serbian Prince, to report that 
Serbian government will seize the first opportunity to legally remove the last limitations that 
still exists in the country, and make Jews completely equal to the citizens of other religious 
creeds.”19  
It is worth noting that Serbia completely agreed to accept the requests and provide 
equal rights to its Jewish inhabitants, whereas Prince Gorchakov was opposed to it. He 
accepted the provisions on religious and civil equality but thought they should not refer to 
Jews, stating that: “the Jews of Berlin, Paris, London, or Vienna, whose civil and political 
rights are certainly undeniable, cannot be mixed with Jews from Serbia, Romania and parts 
of Russia, who are, according to his belief, a real nightmare for the local populations.”20 
Finally, the issue of Bosnia and Herzegovina was resolved in accordance with prior 
agreements; the solution was relatively easy and rather favourable for Austria-Hungary. 
The reasons for such a solution were the actual interests of major powers rather than the 
covertly concluded conventions. The reasons seem to have been summarized best in the 
speech given by Lord Salisbury, the British Foreign Secretary. He pointed out to the 
geostrategic and geopolitical importance of Bosnia and Herzegovina, imbued by religious and 
ethnic differences permeating all pores of social life, ranging from agrarian to political relations. 
He also emphasized that the High Porte was unable and incapable of imposing order in these 
provinces. It was all aimed at supporting the stance that “the government of Her Highness 
recommends to the gathered Powers that the Congress decides that Austria-Hungary should 
occupy the provinces Bosnia and Herzegovina and put them under its administration.”21 
Europe was obliged to face the facts presented in his speech over the entire next century, as 
a durable solution to this problem was still out of sight. As Lord Salisbury noted in his speech, 
“The geographic position of these areas has a huge political importance. If a significant part of 
these provinces were to fall into the hands of one of the neighbouring principalities, a chain of 
Slavic states would extend all across the Balkan Peninsula, and their military forces 
would endanger the people of other races in southern areas. Without any doubt, it would 
jeopardize their independence more than any other issue. However, such a situation is likely 
to occur if the Porte remains burdened by defending its two distant provinces. These 
provinces as well as the Porte would be exposed to huge danger if the Porte kept its 
sovereignty and rule over them.”22 The text of the Treaty of Berlin was devised within 
thus established framework.  
                                                          
19 The speech on the Treaty of Berlin given by Mr. Jovan Ristić, the Serbian Foreign Minister, on 13 th July 
1878 during an 'in-camera' session of the National Assembly. 
20 Records from the Congress of Berlin session, dated 28th June; in: Serbia 1878, documents, p.471. 
21 Ibid, p. 469. 
22 Ibid, p. 469. 
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3. SERBIA IN THE PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY OF BERLIN 
The status and position of Serbia was regulated by Articles 34 to 42 of the Treaty. In 
addition to the provision on the recognition of independence (Article 34), it included the 
provisions on the equality of citizens and religious freedom (Article 35) and a detailed 
geographical description of new borders of Serbia (Article 36). Article 37 verified all the 
previous contracts that Serbia had concluded with other countries and rights, including all 
the acquired rights and benefits obtained thereby, with specific reference to their validity 
until new contracts of the same kind were concluded. This provision was a verification of 
Serbia‟s activities in the international field, stemming from the de facto sovereignty before 
the Congress of Berlin. Given the outstanding importance of the strategic question of building 
the railway, Serbia was obliged to assume the obligations that the High Porte had had towards 
Austria-Hungary and the Company for Exploiting Railways in European Turkey; for the 
purpose of resolving the underlying issues, the provisions imposed the obligation of 
concluding an agreement “between Austria-Hungary, the Porte, Serbia, and the 
Principality of Bulgaria, within the scope of its authority” (Article 38). A special 
inconvenience for Serbia was the provision conferring the Porte‟s debt pertaining to the 
newly attained areas onto Serbia, which was envisaged in Article 42 of the Treaty: “Since 
Serbia is obliged to accept the payment of the part of the Ottoman national debt for the 
new territories obtained under this peace treaty, the representatives of the Powers in 
Constantinople will, upon reaching an agreement with the High Porte, determine the fair 
amount to be paid.”23 Jovan Ristić was vigorously involved in counteracting the imposition of 
these financial obligations on Serbia, which was thus obliged to “bail out” the regions which 
had been liberated by weapons. 
The status of Montenegro was regulated along similar lines, except for a slightly different 
provision on its independence which, in accordance with the aforementioned discussion at the 
Congress, specified: “The independence of Montenegro is hereby recognized by the High Porte 
and all the high contracting parties that have not already done so” (Article 26). Montenegro was 
also obliged to take over the Ottoman financial obligations for the territories it had been ceded 
(Article 33). 
The question of Bosnia and Herzegovina was solved in a single sentence in Article 25, 
which stated: “The provinces Bosnia and Herzegovina will be occupied and administered by 
Austria-Hungary.” The same article envisaged that Austria-Hungary would have its military 
outposts (garrisons) in the Sanjak of Novi Pazar, but the details on establishing the garrisons by 
the Austro-Hungarian units were to be subsequently agreed in a bilateral agreement 
between Austria-Hungary and the High Porte. 
The question of inland navigation on the River Danube was regulated in Articles 46 through 
57, without significant departure from the Treaty of Paris provisions. The regulation on the 
Danube water-flow in the Đerdap Gorge was entrusted to Austria-Hungary (Article 57) and the 
riparian states were obliged to provide “all facilities that may be required in the interest of 
performing the necessary works.” 
Finally, Article 63 stated that the “the Treaty of Paris from 30th March 1856, as well as the 
Treaty of London from 13
th
 March 1871, remain in effect in terms of all those provisions which 
have not been revoked or amended by the aforesaid provisions herein.” 
                                                          
23 The Treaty of Berlin; in: Serbia 1878, Documents, pp. 556-575. 
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After the ratification, the provisions of the Treaty of Berlin were put into effect, which 
eventually closed one page in the Eastern Question but opened another. Now, the Serbian 
government was to introduce the text of the Treaty to National Assembly, assume the 
envisaged obligations and start using the rights arising from the Treaty of Berlin. 
The Berlin Congress was still underway when the National Assembly was convened in 
a regular parliamentary assembly on 24
th
 June 1878. As a matter of fact, this assembly 
session was to be convened in the year 1877; however, given the fact that the dynamic of 
convening regular parliamentary sessions was significantly disrupted by ongoing warfares 
during the two wars, the third and the last session of the parliamentary assembly (composed 
after the 1874 elections) could only take place in 1878. Another reason for the government 
to convene the National Assembly in its old structural composition was the fact that the 
government had a overall majority in that parliamentary assembly. 
The National Assembly was not in a position to either accept or reject the provisions 
of the Congress of Berlin because it was the ultimate will of the great powers. However, it 
was in a position to either support or challenge the government work and activities in 
times of war, peace-making and during the Congress. 
The National Assembly started working while the Berlin Congress was underway and 
when the final provisions of the Treaty of Berlin had not yet been officially promulgated. 
Some indications of territorial demarcation put the Assembly into an absurd position: 
whereas unable to take any action, the Assembly was swamped with telegrams written by 
the inhabitants of the districts which had already been under control of the Serbian army, 
asking for these territories to be annexed to the Serbian motherland, given the assumption 
that these parts were unlikely to be given to Serbia.
24
 Considering that the results of the 
Congress of Berlin were much more favourable for Serbia than the provisions envisaged in the 
Treaty of San Stefano, the government was in a better position. However, the disagreement of 
the committee members in the course of drafting the Assembly address, which referred to war 
devastations, the Topola uprising and a number of other unpleasant issues, clearly indicated that 
the after-war period would reverse the odds, turning the war victory into an uneasy period for 
the government.
25
 The National Assembly was to undertake extensive legislative work, which 
implied the verification of a series of legislative acts caused by the war and the state of 
emergency, as well as the adoption of many new legal solutions necessary to regulate the new 
state of affairs.  
Yet, the most important segment of this session of the National Assembly was the speech 
given by Jovan Ristić in a session held behind closed doors on 13th July 1878, where he 
explained in detail to the parliament deputies the course of the Congress of Berlin and the 
treatment of Serbia therein, as well as the causes and consequences of the new state of affairs.  
In his address to the members of parliament, Ristić first explained the reasons for Serbia 
going to the Serbian-Turkish was and entering the Russian-Turkish war, the reasons and 
consequences for the unsuccessful warfare in the first war, and the consequences of the war 
victory in the second war. While explaining the Congress developments, he provided a detailed 
analysis of interests, aspirations and undertakings of the major powers. After clearly delimiting 
the Serbia‟s wishes and abilities, he elaborated on Serbia‟s perspectives. 
                                                          
24 Stenographic notes from the National Assembly sessions for the year 1877, p.158. 
25 Ibid, p. 38. 
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The complex set of all the aforesaid circumstances also explained the paradoxes of 
Serbia‟s warfare in the previous two years. Serbia went to war because of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, and ended it by expanding towards the south, towards Old and Southern 
Serbia. Ristić explained: “It is not my task here to speak about the war developments; yet, 
it may not be redundant to explain why our military action moved only within the borders 
of Old Serbia, leaving Bosnia outside our military operations. Before Serbia went to war 
for the second time, we had been recommended by Russia not to take any action on the 
River Drina, in order not to provoke Austria; for, the Tsarist Russian government wanted 
Austria to remain neutral. When we posed a question to Austria about its sphere of 
interest, Austria‟s response was: to reach the rivers Drina and Lim. Therefore, if we had 
crossed the rivers Drina and Lim, we would have entered into Austria‟s sphere of interest 
and clashed with its army. By marking its sphere of interest, Austria marked the border of 
our political aspirations towards the west. So, when the San Stefano negotiations began, we 
could not even think of going across the rivers Drina and Lim, just as we refrained from 
crossing these two rivers during the war, but we entered Old Serbia as far as we could. It is 
there that we searched for new political borders.”26 
In his address to the parliament deputies, Ristić also pointed out the corresponding interests 
of Austria-Hungary and Serbia, as well as a significant diplomatic assistance provided by 
Austria-Hungary in and endeavour to achieve these interests. Thus, Serbia‟s military victories 
were accomplished with the help of Russian weaponry and its political victories were attained 
with the help of Austro-Hungarian diplomacy. Elaborating on the diplomatic assistance of the 
neighbouring monarchy, Ristić may have unconsciously pointed to the future direction of 
Serbian politics. 
The territorial expansion of Serbia and the related rationale were apparent. The courses 
of future territorial pretentions of Serbia were also looming around. Given the course of 
his speech, it may be concluded that Ristić considered it important to explain the significance of 
the recognition of Serbia‟s independence. Since Serbia had build a de facto independence 
under the suzerainty of the Porte, which was admitted by the Turkish representative in 
Berlin Karatheodori Pasha himself, it could have been concluded that a wider territorial 
expansion was more important for Serbia than the very act of formal declaration of 
independence itself. The correspondence between Filip Hristić and Jovan Ristić shows 
that that such an opinion was widespread in Serbian politics. Pointing out to the presence 
of this line of thinking, Ristić underscored the significance of the formal declaration of 
independence, saying: “Serbia‟s independence has been recognized. We should not be thinking 
that independence is a small gain. We should not look at that gain from a materialistic 
standpoint and say: we will not be paying 40,000 ducats a year, and that‟s it! We have 
gained much more. The independence of a country is equal to the freedom is to an individual; 
limited independence is thus comparable to limited freedom of an individual. I had an 
opportunity to meet the famous historian Ranke, who wrote about the the history of 
liberation of Serbia. When he saw me, he congratulated me on the recognition of 
independence, saying that it was the greatest treasure that our country could attain. As I 
remarked that opinions were divided on this issue and that some people would have preferred a 
territorial expansion, this outstanding man said that territorial expansion had its 
                                                          
26 The speech about the Treaty of Berlin given by Mr. Jovan Ristić, the Serbian Foreign Minister, on 13 th July 
1878 during an“in-camera“ session of the National Assembly. 
136 N. RANĐELOVIĆ 
considerable merits but that independence is the basis on which countries are created and upon 
which they build their future, which has been proven in the history of Prussia. I mention 
this only because I want you to see how valuable and well-appreciated our independence 
is in the world.”27 
Apart from the high price paid in terms of material resources and manpower, the 
process of obtaining independence with territorial expansion involved huge monetary 
costs as well. The obligation imposed on Serbia and Montenegro to take over a part of the 
Turkish national debt was painful for the two principalities exhausted by war. For this 
reason, Ristić exerted his best efforts to protest against the imposed obligation to buy out 
the districts which had been liberated with weapons. Explaining what sorts of financial 
hardship could have befallen Serbia if all the British and Turkish propositions had been 
accepted, Ristić concluded that the adopted solutions were bearable and acceptable for 
Serbia by virtue of being inevitable. Commenting on the excessive expenditures of the 
Turkish state, Ristić first explained what Serbia had to accept: “Gentlemen, if Turkey were a 
state where state loans were used for fruitful enterprises, as it is done in European countries, no 
more could be said against this conclusion, except for the fact that we have gained the 
new land not by exchange or purchase but by conquest; yet, in this case, the burden is so 
more unfair because these huge loans cannot be traced and are largely a result of “unfortunate 
agiotage”, as suggested at the Congress by Prince Gorchakov. Therefore, the Treaty of Berlin 
is a document which may be either accepted or rejected as a whole, but it is not possible to 
accept one part while rejecting another.”28 
Further on, Ristić explained that the situation could have been much worse for Serbia, 
given the fact that the British and Turkish propositions were aimed at capitalizing on tributes, 
which would make the financial burden several times higher. The great powers had gone 
so far as to draft an article which envisaged the capitalization of Serbian and Romanian 
tribute, the amount of which would have been determined afterwards by the Porte. Ristić 
explained that “Lord Salisbury advocated the capitalization. He raised two questions on 
this subject: the issue of the tribute itself, and the issue of the interests of the High Porte‟s 
creditors. As for the tribute, the Lord found it was not bought out either by huge casualties or 
remarkable victories. If Romanians and Serbs had really won a triumphant victory, the tribute 
would have been bought out; in effect, it was Russia that defeated the Ottoman Porte. On 
the other hand, the tribute is part of the Ottoman pledge to the creditors, which cannot be 
taken from them.”29 These arguments were strongly opposed by Russian representatives 
Gorchakov and Shuvalov, and the French representative Waddington. Gorchakov stated 
that these financial obligations were not discussed when giving independence to Serbia 
and Romania, except for the obligations for the annexed territories. Shuvalov and Waddington 
have, in turn, pointed out to the contributions of the Serbian and Romanian armies to the 
military victory. A strong and perhaps decisive support came from Count Andrassy, who 
reminded that the Treaty of San Stefano envisaged the compensation for Romanian warfare 
expenses, and that Serbia had submitted a similar request. Thus, given the fact that “the 
solution to capitalize on tributes would give rise to new difficulties at the moment when 
all are actively involved in pursuit to suppress any possibility of new conflicts, the 
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Congress decided to revoke the article about the project of capitalizing on Serbian and 
Romanian tribute.”30 
It is interesting to point out Ristić‟s remark that the demarcation of Serbian borders is 
always dangerous for European peace, which sounds prophetic from present point of 
view. Ristić explained that the discussion on the southern Serbian borders was accompanied by 
“lively argumentation and, as the Congress solution only apply if they are unanimous, the 
Chairman announced, regrettably, that the question of Serbian borders had to be postponed, 
stating that the issue of Serbian borders certainly should not take prevalence over the issue of 
European peace.”31 Under the political pressure of French representatives, the question was 
resolved in favour of Serbia but it seems that Bismarck was still considerably anxious about 
what the question of Serbian borders could bring to Europe in the future. 
The last stage in the development of Serbia as an independent state had its epilogue in 
the National Assembly and the Proclamation of Serbia‟s independence issued by Prince 
Milan Obrenovic, which was to be marked by numerous national celebrations. On the other 
hand, these events led to new developments in Serbian history related to preserving the Serbian 
statehood and independence. These new developments played a significant role in the overall 
stability of Europe, world peace, and geopolitical and strategic competition among the 
superpowers throughout the 20
th
 century. Thus, the 20
th
 century events proved Bismarck‟s 
concerns to be true. 
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POLITIČKI I ZAKONSKI OKVIR POLOŽAJA SRBIJE 
NA BERLINSKOM KONGRESU 
San-stefanski ugovor doneo je mir nakon Rusko-turskog i Drugog Srpsko-turskog rata. U ovom 
ugovoru su preovladavali ruski interesi, između ostalog i stvaranje Velike Bugarske, kao ruske 
interesne sfere. Ovakvo stanje nije odgovaralo evropskim silama, koje su regulisanje novog stanja u 
Evropi videle u sazivanju Berlinskog kongresa i reviziji San-stefanskog ugovora. Na Berlinskom 
kongresu, Srbija, još uvek formalno vazalna država, nije imala pravo učešća, pa je svoje intgerese 
branila čitavim spletom diplomatskih aktivnosti, na marginama kongresa i u prestonicama sila koje su 
odlučivale na kongresu. Srbija nije ostvarila maksimum svojih interesa, ali i onim što je postignuto, 
Srbija je dobila više no što je davao San-stefanski ugovor. 
Ključne reči: Srbija, Berlinski kongres, San-Stefanski mir, srpsko-turski ratovi, Ristić, Bizmark.  
